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 Building Relationships in 
 Development Cooperation: 
 Traditional Donors and the 
 Rising Powers
Observations and interviews at international 
meetings have demonstrated the importance for 
staff based in traditional donor agencies to take 
into account the history of aid and development 
cooperation when designing policies and 
approaches. 
History
The experience of the last sixty years demonstrates 
that development cooperation is not just about the 
flow of concessionary resources from richer to 
poorer countries. It is also about changes in 
relationships as articulated through ideas, values 
and practices. There have been three broad phases 
in the history of development cooperation:
•	 Phase one (c.1960–1990)
This phase saw the emergence of a post-colonial 
world and the political and economic challenges 
confronting newly independent countries. At the 
same time, the Cold War created a space in 
which the developing world became a 
battleground, both literally and in terms of 
superpower competition to provide development 
aid to key allies.
•	 Phase two (1990–2005)
The end of the Cold War marked the start of a 
second phase in which the world split into a 
North–South binary. Relationships were marked 
by the absence of strong ideological competition 
among traditional donor countries providing 
concessionary resources.  
•	 Phase three (2005–present)
This is the current phase, heavily influenced by 
the global economic crisis. It is characterised by 
a multipolar world in which rising powers (Brazil, 
India, China and other middle income countries) 
and other former aid recipients have increasingly 
become global players, including in development 
cooperation.
The latter phase has been marked by a number of 
international meetings in which traditional donors 
have responded to the emergence of the rising 
powers. One important meeting, the Paris High 
Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, was organised 
by the OECD in 2005. At this meeting traditional 
donor countries expressed hopes that the rising 
powers would fully buy into the Paris agenda. 
These hopes were not realised. Instead the rising 
powers countries challenged how the North 
defined the means and ends of development. They 
claimed a relationship with their development 
partners based on mutual self-interest and respect 
for autonomy, and contrasted this with the former 
colonial powers’ vertical engagement with their 
erstwhile subjects – a relationship based on charity 
and dependency. 
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Staff working in development agencies from traditional donor countries in the 
North need to be aware of the ways in which their actions are understood by 
their counterparts in the rising powers. IDS research reveals concerns amongst 
the rising powers over the historical baggage associated with Northern donor 
states. As such, the recommendations in this brief focus on the need for 
development cooperation to centre on building relationships to ensure the 
sustainability of cooperation, rather than focusing on short-term goals. Traditional 
donors must consciously change their behaviour, including through a commitment 
to mutual learning.
Another important meeting, the High Level Forum on 
Aid Effectiveness in Busan, took place six years later in 
2011. Here, traditional donors recognised that the world 
had changed. They agreed to a new, multi-stakeholder 
Global Partnership for Effective Development 
Cooperation in which different modalities and 
responsibilities would apply to South–South Cooperation. 
While the Global Partnership was widely seen in the 
North as a good compromise, our interviews suggest that 
this new initiative is not fully welcomed by some of the 
rising powers who appear unenthusiastic about working 
closely at the global level with traditional donors on 
development cooperation issues.
Significance of the role played by identities
‘Identity’ refers not only to how people see themselves, 
but also to how they are seen by others. Importantly, 
identities are emotionally charged, influencing the 
quality of relationships and thus the possibilities for 
collaboration. In the context of this research, identity is 
fundamental to the notion of South–South Cooperation, 
with its roots in the Third World and the Non-Aligned 
Movement from the Cold War. In contrast, traditional 
donors do not always recognise that they may be 
reaffirming their old imperialist identity when they block 
Southern-led initiatives. For example, strong feeling was 
noted among rising power representatives concerning 
the [failed] attempt in 2012 by traditional donor countries 
to limit the mandate of the UN Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD). UNCTAD undertakes research 
and analysis, making policy recommendations on the 
management of the world economy and on the 
problems and prospects of developing countries. These 
recommendations have often differed from those of the 
World Bank and IMF, and it has long been viewed as 
representing a more strongly ‘Southern’ perspective on 
these issues.
Our key finding across research sites confirms the 
significance of the role played by identities during 
international debates on development cooperation. At 
the first meeting of the Global Partnership steering 
group in December 2012, there may have been a failure 
to recognise the emotional importance attached to the 
generation and sharing of knowledge from a specifically 
‘Southern’ position. For example, a response from a 
traditional donor representative to the Indonesian co-chair’s 
proposal for a ‘knowledge-sharing platform’ was that it 
risked being a ‘duplication’ of the World Bank’s platform. 
This did not take into account the fact that the World Bank 
platform will be predominantly populated with resources 
and research that represent a Northern perspective, nor 
that rejecting a Southern-led knowledge-sharing 
platform is reinforcing this Northern dominance. 
The production of development knowledge remains a 
contentious issue. From the early years of development 
cooperation Northern dominance of the knowledge 
industry – including academic knowledge on development 
– was a source of frustration to many in the rising powers 
and other developing countries, since it was seen to 
prioritise a Northern perspective. This led to demands 
during the 1980s for an interdependent and more equal 
world knowledge order. Despite these demands, the issue 
of an unequal world knowledge order remains. Indeed, 
the recent attempt by World Bank president, Jim Yong 
Kim, to pursue a ‘knowledge bank’ strategy is seen as 
perpetuating this Northern dominance.  At Busan, during 
a session on South–South Cooperation, a participant 
challenged the audience to overcome the internalised 
colonial oppression that made them believe that what 
comes from the North is better than that from the South. 
Identity also shapes views on the legitimacy of civil society 
as a global actor. The domestic role of civil society is an 
issue on which the rising powers themselves take very 
different positions. However, they tend to agree upon 
their distaste for Northern NGOs (NNGOs) – funded by 
traditional donor governments – supporting Southern 
civil society voice and action. This means that NGOs from 
the BRICS (particularly India and Brazil) and other rising 
power civil society actors who are engaging in global 
development policy debates are nervous about NNGO 
involvement in their activities. This feeling can negatively 
affect the potential for global influence of rising powers’ 
own civil society actors.  
Development Cooperation: 
the UN context
Parallel arrangements to the OECD-led Busan 
process include the United Nations Development 
Cooperation Forum (UNCDF, established in 2008) 
and the G20 Working Group on Development 
(established in 2010). The former presents the 
bigger challenge to the Global Partnership due to 
its broad-based membership and legitimacy as a 
United Nations (UN) mechanism. Some traditional 
donors have shown indifference and even veiled 
hostility to the UNDCF. Our research found that 
this has been attributed by Southern states and 
rising powers to the relative lack of control the 
Northern states have over the agenda in a United 
Nations space. Even so, it is generally agreed by all 
that the UN’s long-established negotiating blocs 
(including the G77, which groups rising powers 
together with poorer developing countries) are in a 
Cold War time-warp, preventing fruitful 
discussions. Furthermore, although not directly 
concerned with development cooperation, the 
failure to reform the outdated voting and 
membership arrangements for the Security Council 
creates an unhelpful atmosphere. 
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“South–South 
Cooperation 
is associated 
with 
horizontal 
power 
relations and 
mutual self-
interest.”
Understanding ‘South–South Cooperation’
South–South Cooperation was initially about 
knowledge-sharing. Today it is also seen as an 
essential mechanism for promoting economic 
development and self-reliance, increasing 
understanding and solidarity within the South and 
enabling the South to negotiate its demands in 
world forums. 
The historical background to South–South 
Cooperation should be borne in mind in order to 
understand the enduring appeal of this concept. 
Colonial relations and the legacy of the Cold 
War’s Non-Aligned Movement are historical 
undercurrents in both traditional donor–recipient 
relations and South–South Cooperation. Who is 
from the ‘North’ and who is from the ‘South’ will 
continue to influence the future shape of global 
development cooperation.
‘South–South Cooperation’ contains a number of 
meanings associated with horizontal power 
relations, mutual self-interest and absence of 
conditionalities in which countries with recent 
development experience share this with the rest 
of the South. It is about learning from other 
countries’ domestic, post-colonial experiences 
when facing specifically southern development 
challenges – as opposed to the northern, imperial 
experience. Although multilateral organisations 
such as UNDP, the World Bank and ILO have 
facilitated global discussion about South–South 
Cooperation, and several traditional donors have 
become partners in triangular cooperation 
arrangements involving a rising power and a 
recipient country, rising power commentators 
refer more frequently to their own evolving 
institutional arrangements for South–South 
Cooperation, such as the IBSA (India, Brazil, South 
Africa) Dialogue Forum and the BRICS Bank.
These are spaces where development cooperation 
norms can evolve outside the traditional 
international aid architecture. Brazil, for example, 
makes use of trilateral cooperation in the health 
sector, where it collaborated with non-traditional 
donors such as Cuba in African countries, as well as 
with traditional donors such as Japan in Latin America. 
Likewise, South Africa is involved in triangular 
cooperation in African countries funded by Japan. 
The image of a neo-colonial and power-wielding 
North contrasted with a Southern approach of 
non-interference and honest mutual benefit 
possesses an emotional power that should not be 
overlooked. Nevertheless the reality is less simple, 
with interest-based alliances formed at the 
negotiating table. Moreover, the dichotomised 
picture of South–South versus North–South 
cooperation erases the power and politics within 
the South, including among the rising powers 
themselves. These complex identities offer both 
opportunities and challenges for traditional donors. 
Those with a past history as a colonial power may 
find it particularly challenging to relate to these.    
Development imaginations: North or South?
At a time of austerity which often includes cuts 
to the aid budget, some traditional donor 
governments conflate ‘development’ with aid 
effectiveness. Such an increased focus on value 
for money in aid expenditure may respond to 
domestic constituencies in the North, but the rising 
powers see this as unhelpful since, they argue, its 
effect is to ignore the broader global policy issues 
of development that are not directly linked to aid 
expenditure. Rising powers commentators argue 
for a broader view of development effectiveness as 
more than the management of concessional flows. 
Development cooperation should be integrated 
into and aligned with other policy arenas such as 
climate change, international trade, tax cooperation, 
and so on. Traditional donors should recognise that 
development cooperation cannot be realistically 
separated from these areas. 
Over the course of this research, we observed 
concern amongst the rising powers about the 
growing tendency of some traditional donors to 
concentrate their aid in Least Developed Countries and 
fragile states, limiting the possibilities of responding 
to development challenges in the rest of the South. 
Ironically, those traditional donors that have dragged 
their feet over the aid effectiveness agenda may 
actually be better positioned to engage with rising 
powers in trilateral cooperation arrangements.  
Rising powers are generally said to prioritise 
economic growth and infrastructure, compared 
with traditional donors’ aid in support of the direct 
poverty reducing Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs) and democratic governance. Some 
development analysts have supposed that ‘the 
South’ is far more accommodating to private-sector 
investment than ‘the North’ has been. However, 
traditional donors are rapidly changing their 
position, and at Busan there was shared agreement 
on both the importance of growth and of facilitating 
private sector investment as a key development 
driver. Yet while they are undoubtedly very active in 
infrastructure development, the rising powers also 
have extensive technical cooperation activities in 
other sectors where the G20 has laid out key policy 
priorities, including health and global food security. 
These sectoral priority areas offer opportunities for 
fruitful collaboration. 
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Recommendations
In working towards a genuine and productive understanding of the concerns of rising 
power states on development cooperation, Northern government and non-
governmental institutions should manage relationships as a mutually beneficial 
learning process for achieving better development outcomes. This can be achieved 
by adding four kinds of value:
	• immediate value: activities and interactions. This gives a value to interactions in 
themselves, irrespective of any outcome. Non-instrumental relationship-building, 
in which people do things together, would require a significant behaviour change 
from traditional donors who are used to setting the agenda. For example, in 
global spaces like the High Level Forums on Aid Effectiveness, senior staff could 
envisage a more supportive, ‘team player’ role when relating to their counterparts 
from rising powers. In such spaces, informal and sometimes personal engagement 
(such as sharing photos of the family) can be just as valuable in building constructive 
relationships. These ‘softer’ interactions can be overlooked when the emphasis is 
on efficiency.
	• Potential value: knowledge capital. Here value is placed on knowledge that 
may come into use. While traditional donors are valued for their knowledge, by 
lacking awareness of historical sensitivities they can come across as arrogant 
when it comes to their knowledge-sharing. On the other hand, a willingness to 
learn more about the development experiences of rising power countries and, 
where relevant, applying these to their own domestic settings, would demonstrate 
a genuine commitment to knowledge that works, whatever its origin.
	• applied value: changes in development policy and practice. Rising power 
countries are more ready to engage with traditional donors at the technical than 
at the political level. This is an opportunity to deepen engagement and mutual 
learning, and traditional donors would do well to concentrate their expertise and 
knowledge-sharing in areas such as in health or food security, which the rising 
powers perceive as adding value. Knowledge-sharing activities could include 
exchange arrangements and secondments between technical experts, tracking 
and publicising not only how these activities have influenced rising powers’ 
practices but also how traditional donor countries have changed their own 
practices in international development or in their own domestic areas.
	• Re-framing value: changing the understanding of what matters. The historical 
baggage that influences how others perceive traditional donors hampers their 
engagement with the rising powers. For this reason, traditional donors need to 
build a firewall between their development cooperation activities and the ‘old 
world’ global architecture of international relations that is proving so difficult to 
dismantle. In the words of an interviewee at the Los Cabos G20 meeting, ‘this 
requires them adopting a collective, collaborative, global multilateralism in the 
delivery of global public goods’. 
IDS_Master Logo
